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ABSTRACT 
In recent times, the development of privacy technologies has promoted the speed of research on privacy-preserving 
collaborative data mining. People borrowed the ideas of secure multi-party computation and developed secure 
multi-party protocols to deal with privacy-preserving collaborative data mining problems. Random perturbation was 
also identified to be an efficient estimation technique to solve the problems. Both secure multi-party protocol and 
random perturbation technique have their advantages and shortcomings. In this paper, we develop a new approach that 
combines existing techniques in such a way that the new approach gains the advantages from both of them. 
 
Keywords: Privacy, data mining, association rule mining, secure multi-party computation. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Business successes are no longer the result of an 
individual toiling in isolation; rather successes are 
dependent upon collaboration, team efforts, and 
partnership. In the modern business world, collaboration 
becomes especially important because of the mutual 
benefits it brings. Specially, the explosion in the 
availability of various kinds of data has triggered 
tremendous opportunities for collaboration. This paper 
studies a very specific collaboration that becomes more 
and more prevalent. The problem is the collaborative 
data mining. The objective of our research is to develop 
technologies to enable multiple parties to conduct data 
mining collaboratively without disclosing their private 
data. Since its introduction [7], privacy-preserving 
collaborative data mining problem has attracted many 
researchers. The approaches applied to solve the 
problem can be categorized into two aspects: one is 
based on secure multi-party computation [3, 10]; the 
other is based on randomization techniques [1, 4,5]. The 
first approach can achieve precise results but its 
computation cost is usually much greater than that of 
the second approach. The second approach is 
computationally efficient but its accuracy is not as good 
as that of the first approach. This motivates us to find a 
combination in which the two approaches are integrated. 
The combined approach gains advantage of good 
accuracy that the first approach has, without losing  
benefit of high efficiency that the second approach has. 
In this paper, a secure integrated protocol is presented to 
deal with collaborative data mining problems. 
Collaborative data mining includes a number of 
different tasks, such as collaborative association rule 
mining, classification, and clustering, etc. This paper 
studies collaborative association rule mining problem. 
The goal is to discover meaningful association rules 
among the attributes of a large quantity of data 
contributed by all the collaborative parties.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses 
the related work. Section 3 formally defines the 
privacy-preserving multi-party association rule mining 
problem.  We develop a secure protocol in Section 4. 
We describe our experimental results in Section 5. 
Further discussion is provided in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes the paper and lays out the future work. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 Secure Multi-party Computation 
 
Briefly, a Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) 
problem deals with computing any function on any 
input, in a distributed network where each participant 
holds one of the inputs, while ensuring that no more 
information is revealed to a participant in the 
computation than can be inferred from that participant's 
input and output [6]. It has been proved that for any 
polynomial function, there is a secure multi-party 
computation solution [6]. The approach used is as 
follows: the function F to be computed is first 
represented as a combinatorial circuit, and then the 
parties run a short protocol for every gate in the circuit. 
Every participant gets corresponding shares of the input 
wires and the output wires for every gate. This approach, 
though appealing in its generality and simplicity, is 
highly impractical for large datasets. 
 
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining 
 
In early work on such a privacy-preserving multi-party 
data mining problem, Lindell and Pinkas [7] propose a 
solution to privacy preserving classification problem 
using oblivious transfer protocol, a powerful tool 
developed by secure multi-party computation (SMC) 
research. Other techniques based on SMC were then 
proposed in [3,10]. Randomization approaches was 
firstly proposed to solve  privacy-preserving data 
mining problem by Agrawal and Srikant in [1]. People 
proposed more random perturbation based techniques to 
tackle the problem in [1,4,5]. The techniques based on 
SMC have characteristics that mining results will be the 
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same as original results without considering data 
privacy. In contrast, mining results using techniques 
based on randomization will be the estimation of 
original results but performance is usually better than 
SMC-based techniques. In this paper, we propose an 
approach which requires integrated use of two existing 
approaches. Through integration of  two approaches, 
we can gain  advantages of both approaches.  
 
3. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM 
 
We consider the scenario where multiple parties,  each 
having a private data set denoted by 1D , 2D , … , 
and
nD respectively where n is the total number of 
parties, want to collaboratively conduct association rule 
mining on the union of their data sets. Because they are 
concerned about their data privacy, neither party is 
willing to disclose its raw data set to others. Specially, 
we consider the scenario where data sets of 
collaborative parties are binary and vertically 
partitioned [10]. In other words, the identities of the ith 
(for ],1[ Ni Î ) record in 1D , 2D , … , and nD are the 
same, and 1D , 2D , … , and nD contain the same number 
of records (we use N to denote the total number of 
records for each data set).  
 
4. SECURE MULTI-PARTY ASSOCIATION RULE 
MINING PROTOCOL 
 
4.1 The Commodity Server Model 
 
The commodity server model was proposed in [2]. The 
collaborative parties could send requests to the 
commodity server and receive data from the server, but 
the commodities must be independent of the parties' 
private data. The purpose of the commodities is to help 
the parties to conduct their desired computations. The 
commodity server is semi-trusted in the following 
senses: (1) It should not be possible to derive private 
information of data from the parties; it should not learn 
computation result either. (2) It should not collude with 
all the parties. (3) It follows the protocol correctly. 
Because of these characteristics, we say that it is a 
semi-trusted party. In real world, finding such a 
semi-trusted party is much easier than finding a trusted 
party. Based on this commodity server model, we study 
privacy-preserving multi-party association rule mining 
problem. In our solution, the commodities are randomly 
generated permutation functions [8]. Our goal is to 
permute all the parties' data in such a way that a 
designated party (data collector) can conduct association 
rule mining on permuted data and obtain the same 
mining results. The challenge is to prevent the 
designated party from knowing how the other parties' 
data are permuted.  
 
4.2 Notations 
 
For convenience, we define the following intuitive 
notations:  
1. Let V represent a permutation function that is used to 
permute the order of the columns in a data set. We call it 
the column permutation function. We use 1-V to 
represent the inverse of V.  
2. Let H represent a permutation function that is used to 
permute the order of the rows in a data set. We call it the 
row permutation function. We use 1-H to represent the 
inverse of H.  
3. Let VH = (V, H) represent a permutation function that 
contains a row permutation H and a column permutation 
V. VH means that we firstly apply H on the data set, V is 
then applied. We use 1)( -VH to represent the inverse of 
VH. 
4. We use Þ  as the permutation sign. For instance, 
31 RR Þ  means that Row 1 will be permuted to Row 3 
and 41 CC Þ  means that Column 1 will be permuted 
to Column 4.  
 
4.3 Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Association Rule 
Mining Protocol 
 
At the beginning of our protocol, a data collector is 
randomly selected from all the collaborative parties. For 
simplicity, let's assume Party n is selected as data 
collector. The commodity server then generates a set of 
permutation functions satisfying some properties and 
sends them to the collaborative parties. Party 1, 2, …  , 
n-1 permute their data by themselves and send permuted 
data to Party n. Since Party n also contributes its data set 
to the mining computation, its data must also be 
permuted similarly, i.e., the row permutation effects 
have to be the same. To avoid information leak, the 
permutation of Party n's data has to be handled 
differently. In our protocol, the permutation of Party n's 
data is done by itself together with another party (Party i) 
who is randomly selected from Party 1, 2, … , n-1. Party 
i and Party n will together permute the Party n's data 
such that the permuted data have the same row 
permutation as other permuted data sets. To prevent 
Party n from conducting possible attacks, multi-variant 
randomized response technique [4] is applied on the 
data of Party n.  
 
Multi-Party Mining Protocol  
 
Step I: Permutation Function Generation  
 
1. The Commodity Server (CS) generates a set of 
column permutation functions 1V , 2V , 3V , … , 1-nV  and 
a row permutation function H. It then sends HV1 to 
Party 1, HV2 to Party 2, … , and HVn 1- to Party n-1. 
2. The CS generates the other two sets of permutation 
functions '' HVn and ""HVn . It then sends '' HVn  to 
Party n, ""HVn to Party i where Party i is randomly 
selected from Party 1, Party 2 …  and Party n-1. 
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3. The permutation functions have the following 
property: HV1 , HV2 , … , HVn 1- and ''"" HVHV nn have 
the same row permutation effects.  
 
Definition 1 We say two permutation functions 1PF  
and 2PF  have the same row permutation effects if 
)( 11 DPF and )( 22 DPF  have the same row permutations.  
 
Step II: Data Permutation 
 
Sub-step 1:  Permute 1D , 2D … , and 1-nD    
1. Party 1 applies HV1 on its data set 1D  to get a 
permuted data set 1PD , then sends 1PD  to Party n. 
2. Party 2 applies HV2 on 2D to obtain 2PD , and then 
sends it to Party n. 
3. Repeat the above process until Party n-1 applies 
HVn 1- on its data set 1-nD  and obtain 1-nPD , then 
sends it to Party n. 
 
Sub-step 2: Permute 
nD  
1. Party n applies ''HVn on nD  to obtain nPD' , then 
sends it to Party i. 
2. Party i applies ""HVn on nPD' to obtain nPD" , 
then randomizes nPD" using the multi-variant 
randomized response technique described in Section 4.5, 
finally obtains nPD and sends it to Party n (We will 
explain why Party i randomizes nPD" ).  
 
Sub-step 3: Combine the Permuted Data Sets 
1. Party n concatenates all the data sets 1PD , 2PD … , 
1-nPD  and nPD such that the ith row in the 1PD , 
2PD , …  and nPD  becomes the ith row in the joint 
data set PD. 
 
Step III: Mining 
 
1. Party n conducts the association rule mining on the 
joint data sets PD and gets the permuted association 
rules denoted by nPAR . Since the data collector's data 
are randomized, the standard association rule mining 
algorithm cannot be employed. Section 4.7 shows how 
to conduct association rule mining on data sets which 
contain both non-randomized data (e.g., the data of 
Party 1, 2…  n-1) and randomized data (e.g., the data of 
Party n).  
 
Step IV: Final Association Rules 
 
Sub-step 1: Find the Final Rules Containing the 
Attributes from Party 1, Party 2, … , and Party n-1  
1. Party n sends the attributes, which the permuted 
association rules contain, to the corresponding parties 
(from Party 1 to Party n-1) who send the name of the 
original attributes to Party n. For example, if the 
permuted rules contains a rule 
)()( 4513 APDAPD Þ with )( 13 APD from Party 3 and 
)( 45 APD from Party 5, Party n then sends )( 13 APD to 
Party 3 and )( 45 APD to Party 5. Without loss of 
generality, assume the original attributes of 
)( 13 APD and )( 45 APD are )( 83 AD  and )( 35 AD  
respectively, they then send the attribute names of 
)( 83 AD and )( 35 AD to Party n. Note that the attribute 
indices are used in the protocol, e.g., )( 13 APD denotes 
the first attribute in the permuted data set of Party 3. 
However, the data collector does not know whether 
)( 13 APD  stands for bread, butter, or others.  After the 
parties remove the column permutation functions and 
obtain the original attribute indices, e.g., Party 3 gets  
)( 83 AD , they will not send the original attribute indices 
(e.g., )( 83 AD ) to the data collector and only sends the 
real attribute name that the original attribute indices 
denote to Party n. For instance, if the )( 83 AD stands for 
bread, it sends bread to the data collector. The purpose 
of the above process is to prevent the data collector 
from inferring other parties’ column permutation 
functions based on the resultant rules.  
 
Sub-step 2: Find the Final Rules Containing Party n's 
Attributes 
1. Party n sends its permuted attributes that the 
permuted association rules contain, to Party i who 
applies the inverse of 
nV " on the permuted attributes 
and obtains some attributes. We call them the middle 
permuted attributes since they are still in permuted form 
(e.g., permuted by nV ' ).  
2. Party i sends the middle permuted attributes to Party 
n who applies the inverse of nV '  on them and obtains 
the original Party n's attributes.  
 
Sub-step 3: Find the Final Rules  
After obtaining all the original attributes of the 
permuted attributes that the permuted association rules 
contain, Party n gets the final association rules and 
shares them with all the other parties. 
 
4.4 Why Party i Randomizes the Party n's Data 
 
Assume that after Party i applies nn HV "" on the data 
)('' nnn DHV  obtained from Party n, Party i directly sends 
)(''"" nnnnn DHVHV , without randomization, back to 
Party n. Since the total number of records N is usually 
much larger than the total number of attributes M in a 
large-scale data set, the probability of the sum of each 
column being unique is high.  Thus, Party n is likely to 
find out the column permutation function
nV" by 
comparing )('' nnn DHV with )(''"" nnnnn DHVHV using 
the sum of each column. After finding nV" , she can 
The Fourth International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB2004) / Beijing 
 
1175 
remove nV" from )(''"" nnnnn DHVHV . If Party n can 
somehow find out 
nH" , Party n then knows nn HV "" . 
In other words, she knows )(''"" nnnnn DHVHV . Since 
all the parties' data are permuted in a way with the same 
row permutation effects and Party n also obtains other 
parties' permuted data, Party n can find out other parties' 
row permutation function H. nH" is likely to be 
disclosed for any row of nD that has an unique pattern. 
To avoid this problem, we let Party i randomize 
)(''"" nnnnn DHVHV before sending it to Party n. Even if 
the Party n's data has the above special characteristics, 
Party n cannot exactly identify the Party i's permutation 
function 
nn HV ""  because of randomization. The 
challenge is how Party n conducts association rule 
mining after obtaining data set PD. Obviously, Party n 
cannot apply the traditional association rule mining 
algorithm [9], since part of the data set are not 
randomized and part of them are randomized. We will 
show how Party n conducts the association rule mining 
on the hybrid data set PD in Section 4.7.  
 
4.5 How Party i Randomizes The Party n's Data 
 
We propose to use randomization technique [4] to 
disguise )(''"" nnnnn DHVHV . The basic idea is that, 
for each record, we keep the same values with a 
predefined probabilityq ; we reverse the values with the 
probability of q-1 . For example, assume there are 3 
attributes for a record and the values for the record is 
)0,1,1( 321 === AAA . We generate a random number 
between 0 and 1. If the number is less than q , the 
record is kept the same, that is )0,1,1( 321 === AAA . If 
the number is greater than q , the record becomes 
)1,0,0( 321 === AAA . For each record, we generate a 
random number to decide whether the record keeps the 
same values or being reversed. Finally, Party i obtains 
the data set nPD and sends it to Party n. To conduct 
association rule mining on the randomized data set, we 
need to compute )0,1,1( 321 === AAAP . To simplify our 
presentation, we use P(110) to represent 
)0,1,1( 321 === AAAP , P(001) to represent 
)1,0,0( 321 === AAAP . Because the contributions to 
)110(*P  and )001(*P partially come from P(110), 
and partially come from P(001), we can derive the 
following equations:  
)1()110()001()001(
)1()001()110()110(*
* qq
qq
-×+×=
-×+×=
PPP
PPP
 
By solving the above equations, we can get P(110). The 
general model is described in the following:  
)1()()()(
)1()()()(*
__
*
_
qq
qq
-×+×=
-×+×=
EPEPEP
EPEPEP  
where E is a logical expression. In the above example, 
)0,1,1( 321 ==== AAAE  and )1,0,0( 321
_
==== AAAE . To 
evaluate the proposed randomization approach, we 
conduct extensive experiments in Section 5. 
 
4.6 How Can We Obtain the Final Association Rules 
from The Permuted Association Rules 
 
In the mining step, Party n obtains the permuted 
association rules 
nPAR . To obtain the final association 
rules from nPAR , the parties need to apply the inverse 
of their column permutation functions on the permuted 
association rules. In the following, we use a simple 
example to illustrate the computation. Without loss of 
generality, we assume the original data, permuted data 
and permutation functions are shown in Fig. 1. Based on 
the permuted data, suppose that we obtain the permuted 
association rules as shown in Fig. 2. We can then apply 
the inverse of the column permutation functions and get 
the final association rules (Fig. 2).  
 
4.7 Multi-Party Association Rules Mining On 
Randomized Data 
 
The following is the procedure for mining association 
rules on nPDPDPD ÈÈÈ L21  . It differs from 
traditional association rule mining procedure [9] in the 
computation of the frequency count (denoted as c.count). 
When the data are not randomized, we can easily 
compute the c.count, but when part of the data are 
randomized using the multi-variant randomized 
response techniques, computing it becomes non-trivial. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
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For the part which is randomized, we do not know 
whether a record in the data set is true information or 
false information. Therefore, we cannot directly 
compute c.count on the randomized data. In the 
following, we will show how to compute c.count when 
some attributes are randomized.  For example, we want 
to compute c.count for 1A , 2A , and 3A . Let's assume 
1A  and 2A are not randomized and 3A  is randomized. 
We can use the following estimation model. 
)1()()()(
)1()()()(
321
_
321
_
321
*
_
321321321
*
qq
qq
-×+×=
-×+×=
AAAPAAAPAAAP
AAAPAAAPAAAP  
In general, when part of the attributes (denoted by RE) 
are randomized and the other part (denoted by NE) is 
not randomized, then the estimation model becomes:  
)1()()()(
)1()()()(
__
*
_
*
qq
qq
-×Ù+×Ù=Ù
-×Ù+×Ù=Ù
NEREPNEREPNEREP
NEREPNEREPNEREP  
where ^ is logical and operator. )(* NEREP Ù  and 
)(
_
* NEREP Ù  can be obtained from the randomized data 
set and q  is known (With the knowledge of q , Party 
n only knows the probability of each value of 
nPD comes from the values of )(''"" nnnnn DHVHV ). We 
can solve the above equation and get )( NEREP Ù . We 
can then compute NNEREPcountc *)(. Ù= . 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme, 
we conduct association rule mining on the original data 
using the traditional association rule mining algorithm 
[18] and get a benchmark rule sets DT . We then induce 
our rule set GT  from PD using our modified algorithm. 
We test the difference of these two sets. Since Party n's 
data are randomized by the multi-variant randomized 
response technique, we modified the association rule 
mining algorithm to handle the randomized data based 
on our proposed methods in Section 4.7. We run this 
modified algorithm on the randomized data, and find a 
set of association rules (e.g., our rule set 
GT ). We also 
apply the original association rule mining algorithm to 
the original data set and find the other set of association 
rules. We then compute the error which is defined as the 
number of rules that the benchmark rule set DT  
contains but our rule set 
GT  does not contain. The error 
rate is defined as the error divides the total number of 
rules in the benchmark rule set DT .  In this section, we 
will show the experimental results on two real-life data 
sets. 
 
5.1 Data Setup 
 
We conducted experiments on two real life data sets. We 
obtain the data sets from the UCI Machine Learning 
Repository. The first data set is Adult. The second data 
set is Breast-Cancer.  
 
5.2 Experimental Steps 
 
Our experiments consist of the following steps:  
 
Step I:  Since we assume that the data set contains only 
binary data, we firstly transformed the original 
non-binary data to the binary (D). We split the value of 
each attribute from the median point of the range of the 
attribute.  
 
Step II:  We use D and the original association rule 
mining algorithm to build a rule set DT . 
 
Step III:  We randomly select 10% number of attributes 
from D.  For 0=q , 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.51 (We use 
0.51 instead of 0.5. Because when 5.0=q , estimation 
equation doesn't have a unique solution. We call this 
point an exception point in our approach.}, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 
0.9, 1, we conduct the following 4 steps: 
1. Randomization: We create a randomized data set G.  
For each record in the training data set D, we generate a 
random number r from 0 to 1 using uniform distribution. 
If q£r , we copy the record to G without any change; 
if qfr , we copy the opposite values of selected 
attributes in the current record to G and we copy the 
original values of non-selected attributes in the current 
record to G. For instance, suppose there are three 
attributes (e.g., 1A , 2A , and 3A ) in D and the original 
values for them are 01 =A , 02 =A  and 03 =A . If the 
selected attributes are 1A and 2A .  When qfr , the 
values for these two attributes will be 11 =A  and 
12 =A  in the current record of G, but the value for 3A  
is still 1.  We perform this randomization step for all 
the records in the training data set D and generate the 
new data set G. 
2. Build a rule set: We use the data set G and our 
modified association rule mining algorithm to build our 
rule set GT . 
3. Compute the error: We compare DT  and GT , and 
compute the error rate.  
4. Repeating: We repeat the above steps for 50 times, 
and get 1E , 2E , … , 50E . We then compute the mean 
of these 50 error rate scores. 
 
Step IV:   We randomly select 20% and 50% number 
of attributes respectively from D. We repeat Step III 
(1-4) .  Since there are at least two parties in the 
multi-party data mining, Party n has at most 50% 
number of attributes in the combined data set PD if we 
assume that each party's data have the same number of 
attributes. Therefore, we didn't conduct experiments 
when more than 50% attributes are randomized.  
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(a) 10% Attributes Are Randomized 
 
(b) 20% Attributes Are Randomized 
 
(c) 50% Attributes Are Randomized 
FIGURE 3 
 
5.3  Result Analysis 
 
Fig. 3 shows the mean of error for Adult data set with 
the 6.0supmin = . Fig. 4 depicts the mean of error for  
Breast-Cancer data sets with the 45.0supmin = . We 
can see when 1=q and 0=q , the results are exactly 
the same as the results when the original association 
rule mining algorithm is applied. This is because when 
1=q , the randomized data sets are exactly the same as 
the original data set D; when 0=q , the randomized 
data sets are exactly the opposite of the original data set 
D. In both cases, our algorithm produces the accurate 
results comparing to the original algorithm. However, 
the privacy is not preserved in either case because an 
adversary can know the real values of all the records 
provided that she knows the q  value. When q  moves 
from 1 and 0 towards 0.5, the mean of error has the 
trend of increasing, and the probability of disclosing the 
original data is decreasing. Therefore the privacy level 
of the data increases. When more and more data are 
randomized, the mean of error will increase. 
 
 
(a) 10% Attributes Are Randomized 
 
(b) 20% Attributes Are Randomized 
 
(c) 50% Attributes Are Randomized 
FIGURE 4 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, we combine the secure multi-party 
computation approach with the random perturbation 
approach to tackle the problem of privacy-preserving 
collaborative association rule mining. As shown in 
previous sections, all parties' data are permuted, but 
Party n's data are also randomized. As a result, the 
mined rules containing Party n's attributes are degraded 
with a certain level of inaccuracy. On the other hand, the 
rules that do not contain Party n attributes will be 100% 
accurate comparing to the results obtained by applying 
the traditional association rule mining algorithm [9] on 
the non-randomized and non-permuted data. Therefore, 
the results will be the tradeoff between the SMC-based 
approach and the randomization approach. Our secure 
multi-party mining protocol gains the advantage of good 
accuracy that the SMC-based approach has, without 
losing the benefit of high efficiency that the 
randomization approach has.  Although we deal with 
the association rule mining problem in this paper, the 
proposed approach can be extended to solve other data 
mining problems, e.g., decision tree, Bayesian network 
classification, etc. To improve privacy level, we can also 
use multi-group randomized response [11] to randomize 
the Party n’s data. We need also point out that, Party n 
can apply maximum likelihood estimation method to 
attack "H  when the distribution of rows of nD  is 
highly skewed, and the number of records of nD  is 
small. Therefore, the data distribution should be 
considered when selecting the data collector. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
We have presented a secure protocol to let multiple 
parties to find association rules on the joint data sets 
without comprising their data privacy. In the protocol, 
the data collector is firstly selected. All the parties 
except for the data collector permute their data using the 
permutation functions obtained from the commodity 
server. To prevent the data collector from conducting 
possible attacks on other parties' permutation functions, 
the multi-variant randomized response technique is 
utilized to randomize data collector's data. Finally, we 
conduct a set of experiments to evaluate the 
effectiveness of our proposed scheme. 
 
In this paper, we only consider the semi-trust case in 
which all the collaborative parties honestly follow the 
protocol. The more challenging scenario is the 
malicious case where the collaborative parties may 
cheat with each other. As future work, we will develop 
 the protocol to deal with the malicious case.  
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